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Evidence from the Food Supply chain suggests that food retailers often exhibit a reluctance to 
share information with their suppliers even when this benefits both parties. For example, 
inventory coordination and reduced costs may be realized by adopting appropriate supply chain 
management technologies such as cooperative planning, forecasting, and replenishment. This 
behavior is explained by viewing information as a strategic asset and modeling information 
exchange and the corresponding adoption of information technologies and analysis as a strategic 
game, i.e., an economic model where food retailers and their suppliers operate with uncertainty.  
The game is based on stylized facts from the food industry. Some key results from the game 
model are: (a) under certain conditions retailers may withhold valuable sales data from suppliers, 
even if the benefits from supply coordination are reduced; (b) there exists a revealed (inferred) 
equilibrium signal (i.e., suppliers know what orders will be) even when sales data are withheld 
from suppliers; and (c) unanticipated economic slow-downs cause overstocking which harm 
smaller firms more than larger ones, driving a wedge between them. 
 
This is an attempt to build economic (game-theoretic) models that incorporate the realities of the 
food supply/demand chain and then to see what behavior the models predict. Such models have 
been widely used to explain economic behavior and exchange at the agricultural end of the food 
supply chain and for international trade behavior. This is one of the first applications to the 
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 A Model of Information and IT Adoption in Food
Supply Chains
INTRODUCTION
Electronic Commerce is altering the nature and the organization of industries both
in the US and globally. The adoption of digital and Internet technology has been
credited for an otherwise unexplained increase in productivity in the U.S. during the
1990￿s. Understanding the nature of the changes and their impact on ￿rms￿ behavior
and industries￿ structure is crucial for future public policy and corporate strategy.
This task is no less critical in the face of recent contraction of the so called ￿dotcom￿
market. For example, Porter (2001) suggests that the failure of many dotcoms has
been due to adoption of electronic commerce strategies based on unsound business
practices. It is therefore crucial to understand viable ￿rm strategies and industry
structures that are likely to emerge as sustainable in this new digital economy.
This issue is particularly important for the food industry, for several reasons:
First, the food industry has been a leader in information technology initiatives for
more than 30 years. Secondly, thin pro￿t margins in this industry could render cost-
savings from the adoption of electronic commerce signi￿cant at the margin. Thirdly,
the constantly evolving nature of the food industry, resulting from mergers and ac-
quisitions, can be better understood in light of cost and market advantages made
possible through the adoption of information technology (IT). This paper is an eﬀort
to understand the implications of the new digital economy for the relationship among
￿rms along the food industry￿s supply chain. Thus the emphasis is on business to
business (B2B), rather than business to consumer (B2C) forms of information ex-
change. While analytical eﬀorts to understand B2C forms of electronic commerce
have been underway for quite some time (e.g, Varian, 1997, 2000) as well as in the
food industry in particular (Heim and Sinha, 2001, 2002), similar eﬀorts have been
lacking on the B2B segment of the market. This is despite the fact that the B2B
segment is predicted to be the most dynamic part of the new digital economy and is
estimated to grow from $2.2 trillion in 2003, to $7.4 trillion by 2004 (Rayback, 2000).
In view of the above, the paper￿s contribution is two-fold: First, it contributes to
1the understanding of the IT adoption behavior and information sharing of ￿rms in
the food industry. Second, based on stylized facts, costs and bene￿ts of information
sharing are analyzed in B2B supply chains, using game theory models.
The food industry led the early initiatives with the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) organization to develop bar codes (Kinsey and Ashman, 2000; Kinsey 2001).
This led naturally to scanner technology that is used to compile sales data from
consumer purchases. Yet the industry did not exploit the power of this data until
recently (Walsh, 1993). In particular, a 1992 initiative known as Eﬃcient Consumer
Response (ECR) was meant to take advantage of the power of the Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI) technology, making the logistic systems and inventory control more
eﬃcient all along the supply chain. This was primarily a defensive strategy to try
and meet the competition from eﬃcient large discount retailers. The ECR initiative
faltered due to diverse (or no) computer systems in thousands of retail stores that
were incompatible with the suppliers computers. Equally important was a reluctance
on the part of retailers to share sales data with manufacturers. A later development
(1996) known as Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR)
has many of the same goals as ECR and involves a retailer sharing sales data with a
manufacturer (or wholesaler) in real time, often over the Internet, and joining them in
inventory replenishment agreements (Kinsey, 2000). Internet technology helps to solve
the problems of incompatibility but does not resolve the trust issue. Some retailers
fear that suppliers who learn about their inventory, sales, and ordering practices may
somehow share this information with rivals or otherwise use it in ways that would
diminish retailers￿ pro￿tability (Kinsey and Ashman, 2000). This reluctance has also
been reported in Clemons and Row (1993), Progressive Gorcer (1995) and Nakayama,
2000).
In the food supply chain, information is a strategic asset that can determine a
￿rm￿s comparative advantage, driving the decision of whether or not to adopt in-
formation technology. This is true in many industries. For example in banking,
strategic considerations were a driving force behind the initial adoption of ATM ma-
chines (Thakor, 1999). In the food industry, Nakayama (2000) shows that informa-
2tion exchanges plays a role in the power relationship between supermarkets and their
suppliers, impacting their mutual trust and the adoption of information technology
among ￿rms. For example, when the food retailer uses EDI for inventory coordina-
tion, the supplier has a tighter control of the retailer￿s mark-up, raising the retailer￿s
costs. This reduces the retailer￿s incentive to share the point of sales (POS) data with
its supplier(s).
The trade-oﬀ between the need to share information and the need to protect
information is best illustrated in the following question that the retailer asks: ￿What
is the minimum set of information to share with my supply chain partners without
risking potential exploitation?￿ (Lee and Whang, 2000). Gal-Or (1985) showed how
information withholding may be a Nash outcome despite its social ineﬃciency.
The key ￿ndings from our theoretical model are consistent with these stylized
facts. For example, we ￿nd that under certain circumstances a retailer may with-
hold valuable sales data from its supplier, even if this means reduced coordination of
procurements. We also ￿nd that there exists a revealed equilibrium signal about the
market facing the retailer that the supplier can learn, even when the retailer with-
holds sales data from the supplier. Both these ￿ndings are consistent with the avail-
able evidence. Thus, withholding information, where it might otherwise be learned,
points to the possibility of market failure and suggests collaborative industry or in-
dustry/regulator outcomes as mutually bene￿cial in welfare terms. We also ￿nd a
number of results with respect to ￿rm size. For example we ￿nd that the existence
of unanticipated slow-downs that lead to overstocking harm smaller ￿rms more than
larger ones, driving a wedge between the two. The implications of this result for
further industry restructuring cannot be overstated.
We view information as uncertainty reducing and therefore begin with an envi-
ronment of uncertainty. In this environment, information exchange and IT adoption
game occurs between a monopolistic retailer in the product market that is subject
to demand and supply uncertainties and a monopolistic supplier that constitutes the
retailer￿s supply source. The supplier may represent a wholesale intermediary, a man-
ufacturer, a processor, or a broker. Our emphasis on market power both on the part
3of the retailer (vis-a-vis consumers) and the supplier (vis-a-vis the retailer) under-
lies the role of demand in modern supply chains. In fact, it has been argued that
information conveyed from ￿nal demand (consumer) through the supply chain and
made possible by scanner data and technology, has fundamentally transformed the
food industry from a supply-push model to a demand-pull model (Chase, 2000). For
example this process allows for a more complete extraction of consumer surplus from
the ￿nal demand by allowing for a much greater degree of product diﬀerentiation
and price discrimination. In other retail markets use of what is known as ￿Collabo-
rative Filtering,￿1, also used in electronic catalogues, has allowed for the maximum
utilization of the information contained in consumer purchasing behavior to predict
consumer demand and increase revenue.
The next section develops the basic model. This is followed by a discussion of
its applications to the food industry. The fourth section derives the supply chain
equilibrium under information sharing. The subsequent section presents information
management strategies and the possibility of information withholding, drawing on
some summary results from University of Minnesota￿s Food Industry Center￿s (2000)
survey of supermarkets. This is followed by a discussion of the relation between size
and IT adoption strategies. The last section draws concluding remarks and oﬀers
possible future extensions.
MODEL
Information is about reducing uncertainty. Thus, to understand ￿rm￿s incentive
regarding the adoption of IT, we must begin by capturing the underlying uncertainty
environment. We begin with a simple game that captures the role of information
technology in the basic supply chain. As discussed in the Introduction, the game oc-
curs between a monopolistic retailer in the product market that is subject to demand
1Collaborating ￿ltering is a methodology that started at the University of Minnesota Carlson
School of Management and led to the development of the ￿rm Netperception.com in 1997. It
amounts to the statistical use of consumer data, extracted by such methods as Consumer Loyalty
programs, to predict individualized consumer purchases and demands.
4and supply uncertainties and a monopolistic supplier that constitutes the retailer￿s
supply source.
The game involves two stages. The ￿rst stage is a contemporaneous game in
which the retailer acts as a monopolist vis-a-vis the consumer but a Cournot-follower
vis-a-vis the supplier, who in turn acts as a Bertrand monopolist (Stackelberg leader)
in setting the product￿s price to the retailer. The second stage involves a sequential
game in which the retailer must make long term decisions on costly investments in
information technology, based on possible response from the intermediary supplier.
This stage is represented in an extensive game form in which we look for subgame
perfect equilibrium outcomes.
Stage I Game: Quantity and Pricing Decisions
Retailer: In trying to assess the size of the order to be forwarded to the supplier,
the retailer maximizes expected pro￿ts. As mentioned, these pro￿ts are subject to
two sources of uncertainty, demand uncertainty and supply uncertainty. Of crucial
importance is the fact that the adverse eﬀects of this uncertainty on expected pro￿ts
are asymmetric with respect to overestimation or underestimation of the demand.
This will be seen shortly below.
We begin with demand uncertainty. Demand uncertainty arises from the fact that
￿nal sales are subject to stochastic shocks that cannot be predicted so that,
qs − q
f
d = δqs → q
f
d =( 1− δ)qs with δ v f(0,σ
2
δ), and δ ∈ (−1,1) (1)
where q
f
d is ￿nal level of sales (￿nal demand), qs is the supply received from the
supplier, subject to its own uncertainty as described below, and δ is the error in
estimating the ￿nal demand due to random shocks. To keep the analysis realistic,
this error is assumed to be relative, i.e., proportional to the magnitude of the supply
(thus the term δqs on the right hand side). The random variable δ is symmetrically
distributed with a distribution f that has mean zero and variance σ2
δ. But to assure
that q
f
d > 0, δ must be < 1. A convenient way to guarantee this upper bound is to
assume that δ has a truncated distribution which is also symmetric (such as truncated
normal) in the interval (−1,1). Thus, δ ∈ (−1,1) as seen in (1).
5Next, the uncertainty in the source of supply is depicted in a similar way, but is
now relative to a control variable qo that represents the quantity to be ordered from
the supplier. Thus, we write:
qs − qo = uqo → qs =( 1+u)qo with u v g(0,σ
2
δ), and u ∈ (−1,1) (2)
where the distribution g is also any symmetric truncated distribution as before. As
mentioned, qo is the (non-stochastic) control variable to be optimized.




























where P(.) is the inverse demand function, cT is the total u n i tc o s tc o n s i s t i n go f
(a) obtaining the product from the supplier and (b) operational costs of bringing
the products to the market (documentation, invoicing, advertisement, etc.); s is unit
inventory cost. Equation 4 tells us that expected pro￿ts equals the expected revenue
from goods sold (￿rst two terms) less the expected cost of goods sold. The asymmetric
nature of the losses show up in two ways. First, if there is a stock-out eﬀect, this
shows up as forgone revenue.I nt h i sc a s eqs <q
f
d so that the revenue is given by what
is actually sold which is less than what the demand is. This is given by P(qs)qs|qs<q
f
d
appearing in the ￿rst term. When multiplied by the probability of a stock-out
[prob(qs <q
f
d)] one then ￿nds the expected value of this lower revenue level. The
second form in which losses show up is if there is an excessive supply of a good
relative to the demand (qs >q
f
d). This asymmetry shows up because, unlike the
stock-out scenario, in this case we have inventory costs that must be added to the
cost of procurement. Inventory costs show up as the last term in equation 4, with
s denoting the unit inventory cost, qs − q
f
d denoting the size of the inventory and
prob(qs <q
f
d) denoting the probability of an over-stock. Notice also that the second







d which is based on actual sales (q
f
d) which in this case is smaller than the
supply of goods. Finally we have the expected procurement cost term itself, shown
by the 3rd term in equation 4. Since procurement costs are the same regardless of the
whether the amount purchased is too little or to much compared to the demand, the
expected procurement is symmetric with respect to over-supply or stock-out eﬀects.
This is why cT is factored out in equation 4. But this means that the third term
simpli￿es to −cqs,a ss e e ni ne q u a t i o n5 ,b e l o w .
It should be added that in using s to denote the inventory cost associated with the
demand, we have made the implicit assumption that the product is non-perishable so
that eventual sales to recover the product￿s total costs (cT) are possible and the only
loss is storage cost. Moreover, storage costs s may implicitly include time2.
Expressing the probabilities in (4) in terms of the density function f(δ)f r o m



















P[(qs(1 − δ)]qs(1 − δ)f(δ)dδ − cTqs − sqsΩδ (6)
In (6), Ωδ ≡
R 1
0 δf(δ)dδ, representing the mean value of δ, conditional on δ > 0.
But from (1) a positive δ represents the size of qs − q
f
d ( i nr e l a t i v et e r m s )o rt h e
extent to which demand falls short of the supply of goods. Thus, Ωδ represents
the average size of an unanticipated oversupply shock. Since in this sub-range, δ ∈
(0,1), it follows that Ωδ < 1. Although Ωδ is an analytically distinct feature of the
distribution f(δ)i ti sl i k e l yt h a tΩδ is positively related to the variance σ2
δ so that a
2Explicit modeling of time would serve a useful function if products were diﬀerentiable based
on their storage time before sale. At this point, we focus on a single composite product so that
diﬀerentiation based on storage time is not relevant to the present analysis.
7more widespread distribution involves a larger value of Ωδ. However, Ωδ contains a
signal value regarding the extent of oversupply while σ2
δ is pure white noise.3
At this point, expected pro￿ts are still conditional on supply. Thus, we use equa-
tion (3) to ￿rst express expected pro￿ts unconditionally, and then use equation (2)
to re-express the result in terms of qo, the retailer￿s quantity of goods to be ordered
up the supply chain. The resulting expression will involve the stochastic parameters
δ and u, among other things, that are the arguments of the inverse demand function
(e.g., P[qo(1 + u)] or P[qo(1 + u)(1 − δ)]) located inside the integrals. Thus, further
analysis will involve Taylor Series expansion of the inverse demand function, around
qo in order to linearize the function. This expansion is carried out to the second term,
then results are integrated over the appropriate density functions, and simpli￿ed.
Following this process, retailer￿s expected pro￿ts become:















u) − Ωδ]. Notice in (7), that while
the supply and demand uncertainty parameters, σ2
u and σ2
δ aﬀect expected pro￿ts
adversely, the role of the unanticipated oversupply parameter, Ωδ, is mixed at this
point: On the one hand, it aﬀects expected pro￿ts adversely via the revenues and
inventory costs (the ￿rst two terms); on the other hand, it aﬀects expected pro￿ts
positively via the slope of inverse demand P0(qo)( <0)! This observation is tied to
the market power of the retail ￿rm. In fact for a competitive ￿rm where demand is
horizontal and P0(qo)=0 , the parameter Ωδ reduces expected pro￿ts unambiguously,
since the last term vanishes. By contrast, a ￿rm with some market power is able to
lower the price in response to excess inventory build-up when supply exceeds ￿nal
sales (qs >q
f
d ,o rδ > 0), thus moderating the adverse eﬀect of overestimating the
￿nal demand. In summary:
Proposition 1. Market power allows retail ￿rms to better absorb the adverse eﬀect
of oversupply shocks, by reducing prices.
Optimizing Decision for a Linear Demand: The ￿rm chooses the magni-
3Further, note that δ





0 δf(δ)dδ or that (1/2)σ2
δ < Ωδ.
8tude of the orders qo to maximize expected pro￿ts. We con￿ne our attention to
t h ec a s eo fal i n e a rd e m a n d( P00=0) to make the analysis tractable. The ￿rst order
condition,
dE(πr)







0(qo).qo − (cT + sΩδ)=0 ( 8 )













Thus, in order for a unique pro￿t maximizing point to exist, the magnitude on the
oversupply (Ωδ) (in relative terms) must be limited, given a variance σ2
δ.


























Since the denominator of (10) is positive by (9), a positive value of q∗
o in (10) implies
that, a−c>(a+s)Ωs. Inequality (9) also guarantees that pro￿ts in (11) are positive.
Notice that in (11) supply and demand uncertainties, σ2
u and σ2
δ,a ﬀect optimum





















However, the parameter Ωδ continues to play a dual role in its eﬀect on pro￿ts and
orders; via the numerator it reduces both, and via the denominator it increases both.
As we saw earlier, the latter eﬀect arises from the slope of the inverse demand and is
ar e ￿ection of the fact that larger ￿r m sw i t hm a r k e tp o w e rc a na b s o r bt h ee ﬀect of an
unanticipated inventory build-up by reducing prices. All of this con￿rms proposition
1 and the discussion preceding it. However, it is now possible to evaluate the overall
9net eﬀect of Ωδ on retailer pro￿ts and optimum orders. This eﬀe c tt u r n so u tt od e p e n d

















To summarize these ￿ndings:
Proposition 2. Retailers￿ expected pro￿ts and orders are adversely aﬀected by un-
certainties in supply and demand, and given some conditions, by unanticipated over-
stocking.
Supplier: We assume that the supplier is monopolistic vis-a-vis the retailer. To
analyze supplier behavior, we need to ￿r s td e c o m p o s et h eu n i tc o s tcT. Let
cT = c + co
where c is the unit cost that the supplier charges the retailer, and co is the opera-
tional costs within the retail ￿rm, once the products are received (documentation,
advertisement, etc.). Then the supplier pro￿ts are given by:
E(πs)=( c − v)E(qs(cT)) (13)
where v is the unit cost of production, and qs(cT)=( 1+u)qo(cT) by equations (2).
The function qo(cT) in (13) is given by equation (10), so that in line with a typical
Stackelberg Scenario, the supplier observes the retailer￿s downward sloping demand,




(c − v)qo(c + co).(1 + u)g(u)du =( c − v)qo(c + co)( 1 4 )
In other words, the eﬀect of product costs, c, on a large supplier￿s bottom line is
positive to the extent it can be passed onto the retailer (c − v in equation 14) , but
negative to the extent that this would trigger an adverse demand response on the
part of the retail ￿rm [qo(c + co)i ne q u a t i o n1 4w i t hq0
o < 0]. We then substitute
for qo(.)=q∗
o(.) from (10), re￿ecting supplier￿s Stackelberg behavior. Faced with the
con￿icting eﬀects of a price increase on its pro￿ts, the supplier ￿rm must optimize







[a − co − (a + s)Ωδ + v]( 1 5 )
10Notice that a rise in Ωδ reduces c∗ charged by the supplier to the retailer, i.e.:
∂c∗
∂Ωδ
< 0( 1 6 )
This issue is of key signi￿cance to the strategy of IT adoption in the supply chain,
especially as it relates to the food industry. The issue will be discussed shortly below.















In equation (17) there are several key issues. First, as in the case of the retail
￿rms, the supplier￿s pro￿ts fall with the uncertainty in the ￿nal demand (facing the











< 0( 1 8 )
Secondly, the eﬀect of unanticipated oversupply at the level of ￿nal sales (Ωδ)i s
negative via numerator and positive via denominator. To gauge the overall eﬀect,
consider the original equation (14). Diﬀerentiating this equation (when evaluated at


















By (16) the ￿rst term on the right side of the above equation (the eﬀect of Ωδ
on procurement costs) is negative and by (12c) the second term (eﬀect of Ωδ on the
retail ￿rm￿s order size) is negative. It follows that under the condition speci￿ed in




< 0( 1 9 )
For reasons discussed later, this is a key result. It is summarized as follows:
Proposition 3. The supply ￿rms￿ pro￿ts are adversely aﬀected by ￿nal demand and
procurement uncertainties and by the unanticipated overstocking of the retailer, down
the supply chain. Thus, a reduction in these uncertainties and the excess overstock
the retailers, improves both the retailers￿ and the suppliers￿ pro￿ts.
11APPLICATION TO THE FOOD INDUSTRY
Suppose the retail ￿rm adopts a strategy (technology) to predict, analyze and
forecast ￿nal demand. In food industry this could be done by adopting Product
Analysis or Category Management practices. These practices make use of POS data,
obtained from scanner technology, to better gauge and predict ￿nal demand. In our
model, this would lead to a reduction in σ2
δ and Ωδ. The retailer￿s adoption of such
practices would also raise supplier pro￿ts, per equations (18) and (19), giving the
supplier the incentive to learn the retailer￿s information. The supplier could do so by
adopting a collaborative data management practices with the retailer such as CPFR.
However, sharing its market data with the supplier raises retailer￿s unit product
costs per equation (16). In fact, Nakayama (2000) ￿nds that the food retailer￿s up-
stream adoption of EDI for inventory coordination (which approximates the concept
of CPFR here) results in a tighter control of the retailer￿s mark-up by the supplier,
in eﬀect raising the retailer￿s costs. This would reduce retailer￿s incentive to share
the POS data with the supplier. Faced with this reticence, the supplier may pro-
vide the retailer with additional incentives to join in the CPFR technology. One
such incentive, as Nakayama ￿nds, is the suppliers￿ provision of ￿incremental value
added services￿(e.g., analysis and assistance in sales and marketing, providing prod-
uct information, coordination in shipping and delivery, etc.), thereby reducing the
uncertainties associated with supply. In fact, such a sharing would increase retailer￿s
pro￿ts per inequality 12a (second inequality), as we have seen.
Yet, a retailer may choose to act strategically vis-a-vis the supplier in the signal
space. A retailer of this kind would be able to observe the dependence of costs on Ωδ.
Such a retailer would then have an incentive to use POS data to raise his own pro￿ts
(via 12a-￿rst inequality, and 12c) but to withhold information from the supplier to
keep the part of product￿s cost attributable to supplier (c)d o w n ,even when this means
less supply and inventory coordination (higher σ2
u). This suggests one explanation
of the lack of ￿trust￿ in the contract between the supplier and the retailer, that has
often been cited in the food industry and was discussed in the Introduction.
It turns out, as we shall see in the further development of the model, that even
12under theses circumstances, the supplier is able to extract some information from
the retailer, based on the latter￿s quantity of orders from to the supplier. This
theoretical result is supported by evidence in the food industry. Thus Nakayama
(2000, p. 198) states,￿...suppliers obtain more accurate and timely information on
product sales and on their partner￿s operational status through such EDI transaction
sets as purchase orders and product activity.￿ Thus, in equilibrium, the there will be
some information spillover even under this asymmetric information scheme. However,
we shall see that the equilibrium size of this signal may still not match the full
information scheme. This ￿nding has interesting industry-wide implications. For
example, it would provide an incentive to the supplier to downwardly integrate as
is the case with wholesalers SuperValu and Nash Finch who have acquired a larger
number of retail food stores. The supplier￿s quest to access the retailer￿s valuable POS
and inventory data (via retailer￿s internal use of EDI), may be equally matched by the
retailer￿s eﬀorts to protect such information. One way to achieve this that would be
for the retailer to vertically integrate upward, developing its own sources of supplies.
This is exempli￿ed by Wal-Mart, Kroger and other large chains that have developed
their own-warehousing capabilities, known as self-distribution retail chains.
Finally, note that since the supplier has some market power, the component of the
u n i tc o s t( c) that it charges the retailer must exceed the product￿s cost of production
(v) to allow for a positive ￿mark-up￿. But this provides another incentive, other
than information protection, for the retailer to internalize ￿excess￿ costs, reinforcing
the pattern of upward vertical integration. However, this would only occur for self-
distributing food retailers in which the warehousing capabilities already exist. In this
paper we ignore this possibility.
The next section analyzes supply chain equilibrium with an information sharing
schemes, using this as a benchmark against the signaling games and the asymmetric
information schemes discussed later.
EQUILIBRIUM UNDER INFORMATION SHARING
Equilibrium in the supply-chain model just described arises from substituting the
13cost function (15) into the retailer￿s expected pro￿ts (11). Since a component of costs
are set by the supplier, the underlying assumption here is that the parameter Ωδ in
equation (11), which the supplier observes, is the same as that which the retailer
experiences. Thus, this is a full information equilibrium. Let ΠE
r denote retailer￿s






a − co − (a + s)Ωδ + v
2
)( 2 0 )
where πe∗

















Equation (21) prepares the groundwork for a retailer who wishes to act strategically
in the signal space based on the realization that the supplier price c depends on
its knowledge of the ￿nal demand (via Ωδ). For now, however, we treat (21) as the
aggregate equilibrium solution with full information and establish some key properties
of (21). First, as can be seen, the eﬀects of supply and demand uncertainties (σ2
u and
σ2
δ) on equilibrium pro￿ts are adverse as before (see inequalities in 12a). The eﬀect
of oversupply shock, Ωδ, however, needs to be re-examined due to the dependence of










a − co − v
a + s
(12c￿)
Condition in (12c￿) is nearly identical to (12c) with the total product cost cT in
(12c), being replaced by the sum of the unit production costs v and the retailers
unit operating costs co. As in (12c), (12c￿) tells us that a positive overstock shock
adversely impacts retailers￿ pro￿ts, as long as the shock has some reasonable upper
bound.
Firm Size and inventory build-up
One interesting question to ask is: how does an overstock shock (Ωδ)a ﬀect large
and small ￿rms in equilibrium? To answer this question let both ￿rms face demands
with same slope (b)b u tal >a s where al and as are the vertical intercept for large
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(as − co − v) − (as + s)Ωδ
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} = sign{(al − as)(co + v + s)} > 0( 2 3 )
Equation (23) tells us that an overstock shock creates a pro￿tability gap between
small and large ￿rms, in favor of the large ones:
Proposition 4: Although overstocking adversely aﬀects pro￿ts, unanticipated slow-
downs that lead to unanticipated overstocking harm smaller ￿rms more than larger
ones, driving a wedge between the two. The greater are the unit production and inven-
tory costs, the larger is the gap between the two types of ￿rms due to overstocking.
STAGE II GAME: INFORMATION MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
Strategies for adopting IT involve information sharing between parties with the
goal of inventory management and minimization of supply disruptions. Yet, infor-
mation is often the retailer￿s strategic asset and the concern that information may
be used against him/her may temper the desire to adopt IT. This trade-oﬀ is best
illustrated in the following question that the retailer asks: ￿What is the minimum
set of information to share with my supply chain partners without risking potential
exploitation?￿ (Lee and Whang, 2000). Furthermore, an overview of the literature on
how and why ￿rms adopt certain types of IT over others, leads one to the conclusion
that the process of adoption of IT is at least in part the result of strategic decisions.
This issue is clear in Nakayama￿s (2000) study of the food industry in which the
retailer-supplier power relationship is at the core of the retailer￿s decision to adopt
EDI. Thus, based on his survey of grocery stores, Nakayama ￿nds that ￿there is
evidence that power shifts towards suppliers with EDI links.￿ (Nakayama, 2000, p.
208). In others industries (e.g., banking) similar considerations have been raised, as
was discussed before. Formal game approaches have been utilized in other contexts
to study strategic considerations of IT adoption by ￿rms (cf. Dewan, et. al. 2000).
We carry this analysis further. This is done by viewing the retailer￿s choice of
IT technologies as the outcome of a sequential game between the retailer and the
15supplier. The underlying assumption is that quantity-pricing decisions have a shorter
time horizon than IT decisions. Thus, we can model the quantity-pricing strategies
contemporaneously, but the IT strategies must have a sequential dimension.
We base our stylized facts for modeling of the information game on the result of
the annual report from the University of Minnesota￿s Food Industry Center￿s (2000)
study of 344 supermarket stores. This is shown in Table 1. We assume that the food
retailer already has scanner technology, as almost all supermarkets now carry this
basic technology. Beyond this, the retailer has a set of choices: First it may or may
not use traditional EDI data (￿rst row in table 1) to manage document exchange.
Second, even when it uses traditional EDI, the retailer has a choice to advance EDI
to Electronically Assisted Receiving (EAR) (second row) or to the point of Scanning
Data for Automatic Inventory Re￿ll (SDAIR) (fourth row) which may be viewed as
at y p eo fC P F R .I ti si n t e r e s t i n gt on o t ef r o mr o w3t h a tm a n yr e t a i l e r su s et h ed a t a
for the analysis of the market and category management. For our modeling purposes
this amounts to a reduction in the values of σ2
δ and Ωδ associated with an improved
forecasting ability. This information is of critical value to the retailer as well as to its
upstream supplier (the wholesaler, distributor, manufacturer, processor, or broker)
who would like to use it to better streamline and manage its inventory. To the extent
that this would also lead to reduction in ￿noise￿ on the orders from retailer to the
supplier (reduction in σ2
u), both the retailer and its upstream supplier would bene￿t.
But the retailer would have to relinquish valuable information for this purpose. This
leads to the question of whether retailer is willing to share this information with the
upstream supplier. It is reasonable to assume that in table 1, only the fourth row
(SDAIR), which is some form of CPFR, allows for this information sharing possibility.
Table 1
The subgame perfect equilibria arises from the retailer￿s choice of the most prof-
itable strategy, given the supplier￿s response to each strategy. These strategies are
presented in Figure 1. Each strategy is analyzed below:
Figure 1
16Strategy 1. EDI/EAR plus Category Management
This is path 1 in Figure 1. When the food retailer adopts EDI/EAR for inter-
nal use, its cost of handling the products declines (co falls). Additionally, adopting
Product Analysis and Category Management facilitates retailer￿s demand forecasts
and reduces demand uncertainties. Thus, σ2
δ and Ωδ fall. (For simplicity we assume
σ2
δ and Ωδ fall to zero). This increases retailer pro￿ts (inequality 12c). But it also
increases supplier pro￿ts (￿rst inequality in 18 and inequality 19). Thus, supplier has
the incentive to induce the retailer to share this information. Evidence suggests that
in the food industry one such incentive is the supplier￿s subsidizing of the retailer￿s
use of EDI-based technologies such as CPFR4. For our model, we assume that this
technology is provided to the retailer at no cost. In addition, CPFR entails the added
incentive to the retailer that the supplier shares its inventory and order data with
the retailer. This has the eﬀect of better procurement coordination, i.e., σ2
u falls (we
assume σ2
u falls to zero). Evidence for this behavior in the food sector is also found in
Nakayama. Despite these incentives, however, the retailer￿s adoption of CPFR may
nonetheless increase the cost of procuring the goods from the supplier as is seen from
inequality (16), ∂c∗/∂Ωδ < 0. In the food industry, Nakayama ￿nds evidence for this
as the supplier is now able to exercise greater control over the retailer￿s mark-ups
and promotions, in eﬀect raising the retailer￿s costs. For this reason, the retailer may
accept or reject the supplier￿s initiative:
Response Strategy 1.1. Retailer accepts CPFR: Information Sharing
Game: In this case, supply error variance is eliminated to both parties (σ2
u =0 ) .
This is Path 1.1 in Figure 1 and amounts to information sharing since Ωδ =0 ,σ2
δ =0
for both parties. The retailer￿s gains from this decision are its equilibrium pro￿ts in
(21), adjusted for the (￿ow) cost r(F1 + F2)o f￿nancing the technologies, where r is
t h er a t eo fi n t e r e s t ,F1 is the ￿xed costs of EDI, and F2 i st h ec o s ti n v o l v e di np r o d u c t
4Nakayama speaks of EDI technology oﬀered by the supplier. In our analysis this is equivalent
to CPFR since we refer to EDI for the simpler document transfer technology.
17analysis/category management. This yields:
Net Gain of Strategy 1.1 ≡ Γ1.1 = Π
E













2 − r(F1 + F2) (24)
Response Strategy 1.2: Retailer rejects CPFR: Asymmetric Informa-
tion Game: This case, described by Path 1.2 in the ￿gure, is the most interesting
case to analyze, both analytically and because it explains why retailers may choose
to withhold valuable sales data from the suppliers. Consider equations (15) and (16)
where the unit cost of procurement (c∗) may rise to the retailer. A retailer acting
strategically in the signal space would observe the dependence of costs on the infor-
mation available to the supplier. Analytically, this means that the retailer realizes
that the a more informed supplier, while contributing to the lower inventory costs, is
also better able to use its market power over the retailer to set prices to the retailer
(via the dependence of c∗on Ωδ in equation 15). In that case, the retailer may ￿nd
it bene￿cial to withhold sales information from the supplier, by keeping procurement
costs c∗ low, while it can estimate its own ￿nal demand without uncertainty by ana-
lyzing its own POS data with Category Management. In this case, the retailer would
reject CPFR, thus foregoing the bene￿ts of CPFR in terms of inventory coordination
with the supplier (σ2
u remains positive). The fact that information available to the
retailer is now distinct from the supplier￿s information points to an asymmetric infor-
mation exchange between the supplier and the retailer. The retailer￿s pro￿ts under
this strategy arise from evaluating equilibrium pro￿ts in equation (11), taking special
care to distinguish the information available to the retailer (which we call Ωr
δand σr2
δ ),
with that available to the supplier (which we call Ωs
δ). In (11) the own-information
eﬀect enters directly, but the information eﬀects from the supplier operates via costs
(eqn. 15). Thus, we have,























− r(F1 + F2)( 2 5 )
In (25) supply error variance σ2
u remains positive while costs of operation fall from co
18to c
0
o <c o due to the use of EDI/EAR. Also, Ωr
δ = σr2
δ = 0 denote the information
gain to the retailer but not the supplier, who perceives a positive overstock value of
Ωs
δ > 0. Since ∂Γ1.2/∂Ωs
δ > 0w eh a v e ,
Proposition 5: The eﬀect of a retailer withholding sensitive market data from its
supplier is to increase the retailer￿s pro￿ts, all else equal.
Of course, all else may not be the same since, compared to the information sharing
strategy (equation 24), the price to be paid for the retailer￿s refusal to share informa-
tion is the supply uncertainty, σ2
u. The next subsection determines the equilibrium
value of Ωs
δ and further examines this trade-oﬀ.
Equilibrium Signal with Asymmetric Information
A key and surprising ￿nding in this asymmetric information exchange turns out
to be that despite the retailer￿s withholding sensitive ￿nal demand data from the
supplier, the latter will in fact extract some information based on the equilibrium size
of the orders. To see this, note that market equilibrium is attained if an expectation
realization condition is satis￿ed, namely,
q
∗
o|p e r c e i v e db ys u p p l i e r = q
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where we have applied the optimum quantity equation (10) to write (26). Recalling
that the unit cost cT in (10) consists of two components, c
0
o + c, the component c is
expressed in terms of the cost function c(Ωs
δ) in (15). That c(Ωs
δ) shows up to both
parties in the same way is because, on the one hand, the supplier has access only to
the information contained in Ωs
δ and, on the other, the retailer is aware of this fact.
This suggests that while the supplier acted strategically in the quantity space it is
the retailer that acts strategically in the signal space. Beyond that, the retail ￿rm
operates on its own information set, given by Ωr
δ.
We can then solve (26) to determine the equilibrium size of Ωs
δ. First note that
since the retailer has adopted the necessary strategy (Category Management) to elim-
inate market uncertainty, σr
δ = Ωr
δ = 0 in (26). Additionally, we need to relate the
19supplier￿s perceived uncertainty parameter, σs
δ to its perceived mean oversupply pa-
rameter Ωs
δ. Recall from footnote (3) that (1/2)σ2






where α is any positive parameter (<1). For example, α may be a characteristic of the
underlying density function such as the ￿noise-to-signal ratio￿. We then substitute
for σs2
δ from equation (27) in terms of Ωs




















It can be easily shown that for the second solution to exist, we must have:




But this condition is always satis￿ed since 2−α > 1 >
a−c0
o−v





2−α marks a discontinuity for q∗





2 are separated by this discontinuity. Which information
state does the system tend to? It is clear that this depends on the initial level of
informational asymmetry. In particular,
Proposition 6. If market uncertainty is suﬃciently low that Ωo
δ < 1/(2 − α),t h e n
supplier inference from expected orders leads to a ￿revealed equilibrium￿ consistent
with full information [(Ωs
δ)∗
1 =0 ]I fm a r k e tu n c e r t a i n t yi ss u ﬃciently high that Ωo
δ >
1/(2−α), then supplier inference from expected orders leads to a ￿revealed equilibrium￿
such that some residual uncertainty remains facing the supplier [(Ωs
δ)∗
2 > 0].
The existence of a revealed equilibrium that emerges from supplier inference based
on orders from the retailer seems consistent with the evidence in the food industry,
as reported by Nakayama (2000, p. 198).
Comparing Strategies 1.1 and 1.2
Suppose the retailer begins with an initial level of market uncertainty with a
corresponding level of mean oversupply of Ωo
δ. Then, adopting strategy 1 eliminates
this uncertainty entirely regardless of the level of initial uncertainty. This is shown
20by the ￿at line in Figure 2, representing Γ1.1 in (24). Retailer￿s gain under strategy
1.2 is shown by the upward sloping curve representing Γ1.2 in (25). The intersection
of the two de￿nes a threshold value of say, ﬂ Ωδ, given by equating (24) and (25):
ﬂ Ωδ =
[(1 + σ2




Comparing this value with the positive equilibrium (Ωs
δ)∗
2 in (28) one ￿nds that the
positive equilibrium may fall to the right or the left of the intersection value of
ﬂ Ωδ. Thus the two information equilibria fall either on both sides of the intersec-
tion [(Ωs
δ)∗
2 > ﬂ Ωδ > (Ωs
δ)∗





Now, depending on both the initial information about the demand (thus the value
of Ωo
δ) and whether ﬂ Ωδ separates the two equilibria or not, one can ￿nd convergence
to full information (Ωs
δ)∗
1, (Figure 2-Case 1) or to improved information but not full
information (Ωs
δ)∗
2 (Figure 2-Case 2). Moreover, from Figure 2 we can see that when
both equilibria lie on the left of the intersection, regardless of the position of Ωo
δ the
information sharing strategy 1.1 dominates as the information withholding strategy
leads to information convergence that occurs in the range where Γ1.1 > Γ1.2.O nt h e
other hand, when the two equilibria fall on either side of the intersection, the position
of Ωo




2 > ﬂ Ωδ convergence is to (Ωs
δ)∗
2 and occurs in the range where Γ1.2 > Γ1.1 (Fig-
ure 2-Case 3). Thus, information withholding strategy dominates. For lower levels
of uncertainty such that Ωo
δ < ﬂ Ωδ, convergence occurs to (Ωs
δ)∗
1 =0 ,w h i c hi si nt h e
range where Γ1.1 > Γ1.2 ( n o ts h o w ni nt h e￿gure), so that again information sharing
dominates. In short, unless Ωo
δ > (Ωs
δ)∗
2 > ﬂ Ωδ, information sharing strategy dominates.















the condition that (Ωs
δ)∗
2 R ﬂ Ωδ is guaranteed only if there is a low supply uncertainty
σ2
u. This condition is needed together with high initial demand uncertainty (and thus
high Ωo
δ) to lead to information withholding as a dominant and sustained strategy,
otherwise information sharing strategy dominates. In summary,
21Figure 2
Proposition 7: A retail ￿rm that uses internal EDI and category management
practices but chooses not to share market (POS) data with its supplier, will have an
initial pro￿t advantage over a similar ￿rm that shares its POS data with the supplier.
But as the value of the information withheld diminishes (supplier infers the market
facing the retailer), the information withholding strategy may no longer pay unless
demand uncertainty is high and supply uncertainty is low.
Strategy 2: Category Management, but no EDI/EAR: Asymmetric
Information Again
This is path 2 in Figure 1. Evidence from Table 1 suggests that at least in the
case of single food store and small grocery chains (2-10 stores), the majority of stores
use category management, but few use EDI or Electronic Receiving. In the absence
of the basic EDI/EAR infrastructure the supplier is not likely to have the incentive
to provide the retailer with CPFR tools since that technology is predicated on basic
EDI structure for intra-￿rm use. As a result, the structure of this game is one of
asymmetric information similar to case 1.2. The only diﬀerence with 1.1 arises from
the treatment of the costs: the absence of EDI or electronic receiving implies that
operation costs co remain unchanged and that ￿xed costs entail category management
costs (F2)o n l y :
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Comparing Strategy 2 with 1.1 and 1.2
First, in comparing the pro￿tability of strategy 2 above with 1.2 (eqn. 25) we note
that strategy 2 entails smaller ￿xed cost (F2 versus F1+F2) but a larger procurement
cost owning to the loss of eﬃciency when EDI or EAR are not used (co versus c
0
o).
Therefore the overall pro￿tability of strategy 2 may be larger or smaller than 1,
22depending on the size of ￿xed and operational costs. Speci￿cally,
Γ2 > Γ1.2 for F1 large or (co − c
0
o)s m a l l ( 3 2 )
Γ2 < Γ1.2 for F1 small or (co − c
0
o) large
The fact that strategy 2 may sometimes be more pro￿table than strategy 1.2 raises
t h ep o s s i b i l i t yt h a ti tm a yb ee v e nm o r ep r o ￿table than strategy 1.1. To examine this
possibility, we evaluate Γ2 at Ωs
δ = 0, i.e., when the supplier learns full information
about market demand. This provides a lower bound for Γ2. We then compare this
lower bound (which is also one of the its equilibrium values), to Γ1. It follows that,
Γ2(Ω
s




1 is the critical value of the ￿xed cost of EDI, associated with the equality of










(a − co − v)2
(1 + σ2
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]( 3 4 )
This is depicted in Figure 3. From this ￿gure it is clear that when the ￿xed cost
of EDI is suﬃciently high, it is possible for the asymmetric information strategy to
dominate the information sharing strategy, even when the information is fully revealed
to the supplier. This result can be summarized as follows:
Figure 3
Proposition 8: If the cost of EDI is high, a retail ￿rm that adopts only category
management (but not EDI) and chooses to withhold market (POS) data from its
supplier, can maintain a pro￿t advantage over a similar ￿rm that shares its POS
data with the supplier, even as the value of the information withheld diminishes (i.e.,
as supplier infers the market facing the retailer).
The preponderance of retail ￿rms in the food sector that just adopt category
management (see Table 1), combined with the evidence (cited earlier) on a lack of
trust in information sharing in this sector, are consistent with Proposition 8, and
s u g g e s tt h a tt h e￿xed cost of EDI may in fact be substantial at least for food retailers
23that operate in smaller scale. This issue is taken up in the next sub-section. First,
however, we consider brie￿y the retail ￿rm￿s remaining strategy, which is not to adopt
any IT strategies at all.
Strategy 3: No EDI/EAR or Category Management
This is the ￿reference￿ or the ￿base￿ strategy. In this case all uncertainty param-
eters are non-zero and equation 21 itself provides the pro￿t term. This equation is
also depicted in Figure 3, by the curve Γ3. As seen this curve is downward sloping
because informational advantages of the ￿rm over its supplier are now removed from
the model, so that increased uncertainty reduces ￿rm pro￿t s .I ti sp o s s i b l et h a tt h i s
strategy could be the dominant one if the ￿xed costs F1 and F2 associated with other
IT strategies are prohibitively high, the operating cost advantage associated with the
EDI strategy (c0
o relative to co) is small, or the degree of market uncertainty and the
associated overstock values are small.
Firm Size and IT Adoption
One immediate result that follows from the above equations is that ￿rm size
(determined by the quantity of orders) in￿uences the likelihood of which strategies
it is likely to adopt. This is because pro￿ts under these strategies must exceed the
threshold of ￿xed costs and this is more likely for larger ￿rms. To see this we need to
relate ￿rm level of quantity ordered (which measures the size) to ￿rm pro￿ts (which







a − cT − (a + s)Ωδ
(35)
Setting the pro￿t ￿ow in (35) to the ￿nancing cost of IT, then, any strategy with a





a − cT − (a + s)Ωδ
≡ G(F)( 3 6 )
where G(F) is linear and increasing function of F as seen in (36). Now consider
the three strategies discussed above. Recall that the ￿xed costs associated with the
three strategies are, F1 + F2, F2 and zero for strategies 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
24It follows that ￿rms that are too small (q∗
o <G (F2)) cannot aﬀord to adopt any
technology (strategy 3), medium size ￿rms (G(F2) <q ∗
o <G (F1+F2)) will be able to
aﬀord technologies needed only for eﬃcient category management (strategy 2), and
large ￿rms (q∗
o >G (F1 + F2)) will be able to aﬀord category management as well as
EDI/EAR technologies (Strategy 1). Thus,
Proposition 9: Firm size determines the feasibility of adopting any form of in-
formation technology, in that smaller ￿r m sm a yn o tb ea b l et oc o v e rt h e￿xed costs of
such technologies and will not adopt them, intermediate size ￿rms can adopt a limited
form of the technology and only the largest ￿rms can adopt the costliest technology.
This result is roughly consistent with what we ￿nd in the literature and particu-
larly with the ￿ndings reported in the University of Minnesota￿s Food Center Report
(2000) on its survey of grocery stores nationwide.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper develops an optimization model that explains the adoption of informa-
tion technology by retail ￿rms along the supply chain. It focuses on (a) the uncertainty
environment underlying the decision to adopt IT and (b) the strategic dimension of
IT adoption decisions from the view point of withholding or sharing information. We
￿nd that information reduces procurement and demand uncertainties, reducing costs
to all parties and raising pro￿tability. This is consistent with observations in the re-
tail food industry. But we are also able to explain why food retailers tend to withhold
sales data from their suppliers, as has been observed in the food industry. Further,
we determine the circumstances that this is likely to occur, adding to the predictive
value of this research. We also determine that there exists a revealed equilibrium
signal about the market facing the retailer that the supplier can infer, even when the
retailer withholds sales data from the supplier. The notion that some information may
be inferred by the supplier is also consistent with some of the observed patterns in
the food industry (see the text). The existence of information withholding behavior,
where it might otherwise be learned, points to possible market failure and suggests
collaborative industry or industry/regulator outcomes as mutually bene￿cial.
25The model is suited to the stylized facts of the food industry where distributors
(suppliers) have market power over retailer (buyers), and so information withholding
takes place to counter this supplier￿s market power. However, studies have shown
(e.g., Dai and Kauﬀman, 2001) that even when market power is on the side of the
buyer, and sellers are numerous, as in buyer-initiated supply chains (e.g., Dell Com-
puters, Sears and Wal-Mart), the question of information loss is crucial. Our model,
starting with basic pro￿t maximizing principles can be extended to address these
types of markets as well. It oﬀers a rigorous basis for such extensions.
Another contribution of this paper is that by modeling market demand uncertainty
we are able to measure ￿unanticipated overstocks.￿ This allows us to trace the eﬀects
of market uncertainty on small and large ￿rms. By ￿nding that increased uncertainty
favors larger ￿rms over smaller ones, the paper provides a basis for explaining industry
restructuring. Also we can ask: How is the IT adoption decision of ￿rms in￿uenced
by the specter of an unanticipated inventory accumulation in the face of current
economic slow down?
One of the next steps is to test the propositions with empirical evidence and to
extend the models to cases where retailers and wholesalers are vertically integrated.
T h e r es h o u l db el i t t l ed i ﬀerence from the models herein. However, one diﬀerence may
be that it would be the store chain headquarters (which owns their own distribution
centers) that chooses to share sales data with manufacturers. Among the predictions
of the model for example is that one would expect that manufacturers will ascertain
their buyers￿ sales from historical data.
One option that has not been considered here because it is not as critical to the
food industry, but is much more important in other industries, is the adoption of
the technology that allows the independent retailer to take advantage of the B2B
exchanges directly. However, even this option may be rising in its signi￿cance for the
food sector (see for example Shulman, 2000) which has lagged considerably behind
the manufacturing sector in this respect. Thus for example, food retailers may join
an B2B exchange such as Transora using standardized protocol set by UCCNET
(Shulman, 2000). However, adopting this option involves trade-oﬀs as well. On the
26one hand, the retailer is able to secure the least costly procurement of supplies by
directly purchasing from the producer(s), rather than warehousing intermediaries. On
the other hand, the absence of contractual supplier-retailer relationships and certainly
the absence of inventory coordination through EDI strategies implies that supply
uncertainties σ2
u cannot be eliminated. In fact two studies, one by Dai and Kauﬀman
(2002) and the other by Kauﬀman and Mohtadi (2002), argue precisely this point:
i.e., that the risk versus cost trade-oﬀs are the distinguishing features of the internet
based B2B procurement systems versus the traditional EDI systems. This persistence
of supply uncertainties, as opposed to EDI based systems in fact characterizes much
of the food industry because of the perishable nature of the products.
It should also be added that other characteristics of the food industry, perishability
and high product variety can easily be incorporated into our model. Perishability
aﬀects s or the storage cost; product variety aﬀects b or the slope of the demand, to
the extent that it increases product substitutions.
Finally, network eﬀects may be present as well. Such eﬀects have been studied
extensively since the pathbreaking work of Katz and Shapiro (1994) (see for exam-
ple, Economides, 1996), and even applied to electronic commerce (MacKie-Mason,
Shenker and Varian, 1996). Network eﬀects may tend to counter the reluctance to
adopt information technology due to trust issues, since they would raise the opportu-
nity cost of non-participation to the retailers who do not participate. With network
eﬀects included one would expect that larger ￿rms (chains) would share more data,
and that even smaller chains will begin to share sales data with their suppliers as
they realize the bene￿ts of network eﬀects over concerns about trust.
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29Table 1
IT Adoption Practices by Retailers in Food Supply Chains*
Percentage of Stores Adopting Different IT Practices
Firm Size by the Number of Stores: 
Single Stores2-10 Stores 11-30 Stores 31-60 Stores   >60 Stores
Electronic Data Interchange  19% 24% 37% 38% 48%
(EDI)
Electronic Assisted Receiving  28% 37% 56% 65% 78%
(EAR)
Product Movement Analysis/
      Category Management 81% 75% 77% 88% 90%
Sanning Data for Automatic  5% 1% 6% 4% 25%
Inventory Refill (SDAIR) 
*Souce:  Extracted from The "2000 Supermarket Panel Annual Report," by The Retail Food Industry Center (now the Food 
Industry Center) at the University of Minnesota.Figure 1 
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